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If your language did not have words for numbers,
would you be able to think about numeric
quantities? An Amazonian culture where number
words are limited to one, two and many has
provided new insights to the interaction between
thought and language.
Lev Vygotsky [1] wrote in a 1934 essay that “the
relation of thought to word is not a thing but a
process, a continual movement back and forth from
thought to word and from word to thought.” This
reciprocal interchange between thought and language
is central to our ability to communicate as scientists.
While many agree that there must be an interaction
between the thoughts that we have and the language
we speak (Figure 1), there is considerable variation in
the literature regarding whether language or thought
is the decisive factor. 
Many contemporary psychologists express the view
that thought drives language [2–4]. One version of this
view is that thought precedes language. Everyone is
born with a set of universal concepts that are inde-
pendent of language, and these concepts give
meaning to the words that they hear [5]. An alternative
view is that language shapes thought. This view,
referred to as linguistic relativity, implies that speakers
of different languages are guided by the grammar of
their language to organize experiences differently
[6–8]. Cross-linguistic comparisons show that lan-
guages vary in how they categorize color, space, time
and number [2,9–12]. Linguistic relativity would
suggest that these differences influence the way one
categorizes the world, and that speakers of different
languages think about the world differently.
Peter Gordon [12] has now reported data that
support a strong version of linguistic relativity. Gordon
describes a culture whose number words consist of
approximately one, approximately two and many. The
people who speak this language show poor discrimi-
nation between any numeric quantities larger than 3.
The evidence comes from a culture named the Pirahã
who live in Brazil but reject assimilation to the main-
stream Brazilian culture (Figure 2). Gordon used a
variety of number tasks that ranged from the relatively
easy/concrete to difficult/abstract. An example of the
former was a matching task using everyday objects;
the participants were presented with an array of AA
batteries and had to recreate the array on their side of
a table with their own set of batteries. One of the more
difficult tasks was drawing a single line for each
battery displayed on the other side of the table (the
Pirahã culture does not draw or use writing, so this
task was extremely demanding for the participants).
The results reported by Gordon [12] indicate that
the Pirahã were generally accurate up to quantities of
2 or 3, but their performance deteriorated from 4 to 10.
Even with a task where the participant was highly
motivated, for example where there was a reward for
remembering the difference between 3 and 4, the
results were just at the chance level. It is noteworthy
that performance for the larger numbers was not
random; the answers increased as the overall number
increased, suggesting that their answers were a rough
approximate of the correct number. 
This report [12] of the Pirahã number ability
coincides with recent theories about number abilities.
There is a dual model that suggests there are different
signatures for small and large number abilities
[11,13–15]. The small number ability allows detection
of up to 3 objects quickly and accurately without
counting them. The large number ability allows
approximation of large quantities; however, the
amount of error is proportional to the set size. For
example, the ability to discriminate 8 from 16 is equiv-
alent to discriminating 16 from 32 because the ratio,
1:2, is the same in both cases. The dual model number
sense is evident in human infants as well as many
non-human species. Gordon’s discoveries are impor-
tant for what they reveal about the human number
concepts. The Pirahã culture provides a sample of the
broad range in human number abilities. Could this be
a view of our innate number ability when it is not
elaborated by written number and word?
The description of the Pirahã’s number ability [12] is
similar to many historic examples of other cultures.
There has been speculation that the transition between
cultures that have an approximate number system, like
the Pirahã, and symbolic number systems, such as
English, appears to involve a stage where the approx-
imate number system is elaborated by a one-to-one
correspondence of body parts with the enumerated
objects. Many of the tasks Gordon [12] used on the
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Figure 1. Numbers are in integral part of our culture. It is hard
to imagine what it would be like not to have number symbols.
Pirahã required making a one-to-one mapping
between the objects they were manipulating and the
batteries displayed on table. It is clear from the results
that the Pirahã do not use body parts for enumeration.
Making the transition beyond the finite set of body
parts to potentially infinite numerosities seems to
require an abstract symbol system. Historic examples
reveal that written language and abstract number
systems seem to coincide in many cultures. The Pirahã
provide a rare example of a culture without the use of
one-to-one mappings or a symbolic number system.
Gordon [12] has provided the scientific community
with an excellent study that helps fuel the debate on
thought and language. The data are presented as
evidence in favor of a strong version of linguistic
relativism, because the absence of discrete number
words in the Pirahã language appears to preclude the
ability to conceptualize large numerosities. Seminal
papers often raise as many questions as they answer,
and this one begs the question of whether the lan-
guage or culture is responsible for the absence of dis-
crete number words. It is not clear, however, how one
could separate the relative influences of language and
culture. Many opportunities and challenges remain in
understanding our number system and how it relates
to thought and language. It is clear that the number
abilities of the Pirahã are different from our symbolic
number system. Future studies may clarify whether
these differences are a matter of degree or of a quali-
tatively different system. Until then, we have some
exceptional new data to contemplate. 
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Figure 2. A Pirahã tribesman performing the matching task
[12]. Photograph courtesy of Peter Gordon. See text for
details.
